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INTRODUCTION
Cesar Matias, a gay man from Honduras, fled to the United
States more than a decade ago to escape severe persecution suf-
fered because of his sexual orientation. He worked as a hair stylist
and in a clothing factory in Los Angeles and rented a small, one-
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bedroom apartment. He never made enough money to save be-
cause he had to spend all his earnings on rent, groceries, clothing,
and other necessities. Immigration authorities arrested Mr. Matias
in March 2012 and locked him up in the city jail in Santa Ana,
California, while his application for asylum was being decided. An
immigration judge found that he posed no threat to the commu-
nity and no significant flight risk, and ordered him released on a
$3,000 bond. Yet more than four years after his arrest, Mr. Matias was
still locked up simply because he couldn’t afford to make his
bond.1
It has long been recognized that the American money bail sys-
tem is broken.2 Every day hundreds of thousands of criminal de-
fendants are in jail not because they pose a flight risk or danger to
the community, but simply because they are too poor to pay for
their release.3 Many reformers have called for an end to the reli-
ance on money bail altogether.4 But at a minimum, detention sys-
tems that rely on money bail must include protections to ensure
that people are not locked up because of their poverty. Indeed,
there is a growing consensus in federal courts—in part due to the
urging of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under the
Obama administration—that locking up criminal defendants solely
because of their inability to pay for their release is
unconstitutional.5
1 Hernandez v. Lynch, No. EDCV 16-00620-JGB (KKx), 2016 WL 7116611, at *7-8
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2016); see also Michael Tan, Immigrants Shouldn’t Be Locked Up for
Being Poor, ACLU (Apr. 6, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://perma.cc/Y6HG-LQK9.
2 See, e.g., Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address by
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy American Bar Association House of Delegates
(Aug. 6, 1962), https://perma.cc/Z6MX-NP2U (“The problem of bail . . . [is] that the
question of whether a man will be kept in jail pending trial or be free is directly
influenced by how wealthy he is.”). For purposes of this article, “money bail” refers to
a secured money bond—that is, an amount of money set by a government official that
a person is obligated to pay as a condition of his or her pretrial release. The Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (“INA”) and its implementing regulations use the term
“bond” as opposed to “bail”—as is commonly used in the criminal justice context—to
refer to a monetary condition of pretrial release. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2017); 8
C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1) (2017).
3 See, e.g., Ram Subramaniam et al., Vera Inst. of Justice, INCARCERATION’S FRONT
DOOR: THE MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 29-30 (2015).
4 See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM HARVARD LAW SCH., MOVING BEYOND
MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 14-29 (2016).
5 See infra Part II; see also Statement of Interest of the United States, Varden v. City
of Clanton, No. 2:15cv34-MHT-WC (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2015), ECF No. 26, https://
perma.cc/65UE-2QRD; see also Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15cv34-MHT, 2015 WL
5387219 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015). In December 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
rescinded DOJ guidance to state and local governments adopting this position. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Jeff Sessions Rescinds 25 Gui-
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Basic protections against such unlawful imprisonment are also
lacking in the immigration detention system operated by the fed-
eral government. Immigration officials are not required to con-
sider a person’s financial circumstances when setting a bond, nor
are they required to consider whether alternatives to money bail—
such as electronic monitoring or reporting requirements—would
permit the person’s release.6 Moreover, where a bond is set, immi-
grants must post the full cash bond amount to be released, instead
of being permitted to post—as is common in many criminal bail
systems—other forms of collateral such as a deposit bond or prop-
erty.7 Worse still, there is no mechanism for an immigrant detained
on an unaffordable bond to ask an immigration judge to consider
release on alternative conditions, regardless of the length of his
detention.8 The result is that immigrants like Mr. Matias are rou-
tinely detained pending their removal cases—often for months, or
even years—solely because they are unable to afford their bonds.
In November 2016, the ACLU won a path-breaking decision in
the U.S. District Court of the Central District of California holding
that the federal government’s detention of immigrants based on
their poverty alone violated both the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”) and the U.S. Constitution. In Hernandez v. Lynch—or,
as it is now known, Hernandez v. Sessions—the District Court
granted a class-wide preliminary injunction requiring, for the first
time in the history of the immigration system, basic procedures to
ensure that immigrants are not incarcerated solely because they
lack financial resources.9 In October 2017, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the preliminary injunction order in a ruling that stands to
have far-reaching impact.10 Approximately one-fifth of the nation’s
immigration detainees are imprisoned in facilities in the Ninth
Circuit.11
Moreover, Hernandez has only taken on more significance in
the wake of President Trump’s Executive Orders on immigration
enforcement. Executive Order No. 13767 on border security has
dance Documents (Dec. 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/J6VX-FLYC (rescinding, inter
alia, the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Dear Colleague Letter on Enforcement of Fines and
Fees (Mar. 14, 2016)).
6 See Hernandez v. Lynch, No. EDCV 16-00620-JGB (KKx), 2016 WL 7116611, at
*5-6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2016).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.; see also infra Part III.
10 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017).
11 See generally Cmty. Initiatives for Visiting Immigrants in Confinement, Immigra-
tion Detention Map & Statistics, CIVIC, https://perma.cc/K8NA-5VSV.
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promised an unprecedented expansion of immigration detention,
under the banner of ending the immigration authorities’ pur-
ported policy of “catch and release,” and threatens the categorical
detention of people who unlawfully cross the border, without any
individualized consideration of whether they pose a danger or
flight risk that warrants their incarceration.12 In a new era of mass
detentions and deportations, it has become all the more critical to
ensure that basic safeguards are in place to protect immigrants
from the arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains how immi-
gration bonds are currently set and why they routinely result in
detention of the immigrant poor. Part II reviews the constitutional
limits on detention based on indigency alone. Part III provides an
overview of the Hernandez litigation and the district court’s ruling.
Part IV examines the President’s Executive Order on border secur-
ity and its implications for the future of the immigration detention
system and the jailing of the immigrant poor.
I. HOW DO IMMIGRATION BONDS WORK?
The jailing of the immigrant poor has become an increasingly
urgent issue in the last two decades with the expansion of mass
immigration detention. Today, the government detains large num-
bers of immigrants in the hundreds of jails and jail-like facilities
across the United States. But this practice is relatively new. “In
1980, fewer than 2,000 people were held in immigration detention
nationwide” on any given day.13 “Between 1980 and 1990, the sys-
tem more than tripled in size, to nearly 7,000 beds. And in the last
two decades, it has exploded.”14 Between 1995 and 2016, the aver-
age daily immigration detention population grew from approxi-
mately 7,500 to 33,300 persons.15 In the first half of 2016, the
average daily population grew to record levels, hitting nearly
37,000 people in June 2016.16 This surge was fueled “by a sharp
increase in the number of immigrants and asylum-seekers who
[were] detained despite not having any history of criminal convic-
12 See Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017); see also infra Part
IV.
13 CARL TAKEI ET AL., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, SHUTTING DOWN THE PROFITEERS:




16 Id. at 7-8.
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tions.”17 “As of June 2016, the majority of immigration detainees—
more than 20,000 people” on a given day—had no criminal record,
and many of them were eligible for release on bond or conditions
of supervision pending removal proceedings to determine their
right to remain in the United States.18 In August of 2017, ICE held
a daily average of 38,153 people in immigration detention.19 Re-
portedly, the Trump administration aims to eventually double de-
tention capacity to 80,000 beds.20
The statutes governing this massive prison system are notori-
ously byzantine. Hernandez specifically concerns people detained
under Section 236(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”).21 The government generally applies Section 236(a) to the
detention of noncitizens who are apprehended in the interior of
the United States pending their removal proceedings. The statute
provides that, “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be
removed from the United States . . .”
the Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the At-
torney General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .22
Pursuant to implementing regulations, U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement (“ICE”)—the arresting authority—makes the
initial custody determination, which is subject to review at a bond
hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”).23 To obtain release,
the noncitizen “must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer
that [his or her] release would not pose a danger to property or
persons, and that [he or she] is likely to appear for any future
17 Id. at 8.
18 Id.
19 Libby Rainey, ICE Transfers Immigrants Held in Detention Around the Country to Keep
Beds Filled. Then It Releases Them, With No Help Getting Home, DENVER POST (Sept. 17,
2017, 12:01 AM), https://perma.cc/6WGW-3FP2.
20 Brian Bennett, Not Just ‘Bad Hombres’: Trump Is Targeting Up to 8 Million People for
Deportation, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017, 12:00 PM), https://perma.cc/S3TN-9CSK.
21 INA § 236(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2017)).
22 Id. INA § 236(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)), contrast with two other stat-
utes that govern detention pending removal proceedings: INA § 236(c) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2017)), which provides for the mandatory detention of noncitizens
who are apprehended inside the United States and face removal based on certain
crimes, and INA § 235(b) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2017)), which provides for
the detention of noncitizens apprehended when arriving at a port-of-entry.
23 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(d)(1), 1003.19 (2017).
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proceeding.”24
If the person proves that he does not pose a danger and is
likely to appear at future proceedings, the ICE officer or IJ deter-
mines whether the noncitizen may be released on his or her own
recognizance, bond, or other conditions that would sufficiently ad-
dress any risk of the immigration detainee fleeing before adjudica-
tion of his or her immigration case.25 Such conditions could
include electronic monitoring, periodic reporting requirements,
restrictions on travel, or enrollment in a substance abuse pro-
gram.26 The IJ’s bond determination is reviewable by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), the administrative appellate body
within the Executive Office for Immigration Review.27 By statute, if
the ICE officer or IJ sets a cash bond, that bond must be a mini-
mum of $1,500 “with security approved by . . . the Attorney
General.”28
As a matter of policy and practice, neither the ICE officer nor
the IJ is required to consider a detainee’s financial ability to pay
when setting a bond.29 Nor are ICE officers or IJs required to deter-
mine whether conditions of supervision, alone or in combination
with a lower bond, would suffice to allow for the person’s release.30
Instead, the BIA has held that an immigration official “has broad
discretion in deciding the factors that he or she may consider in
custody redeterminations.”31 And in several unpublished decisions,
the BIA has held that a person’s financial circumstances are irrele-
vant to a bond determination.32 Not surprisingly then, immigration
24 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (2017); Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A.
2006) (“The burden is on the alien to show to the satisfaction of the Immigration
Judge that he or she merits release on bond.”). Under the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016), certain noncitizens initially detained under color
of other statutes become entitled to bond hearings under Section 236(a) after their
detention exceeds six months. At those hearings, the government bears the burden of
proof “to justify a non-citizen’s detention by clear and convincing evidence.” Rodri-
guez, 804 F.3d at 1087.
25 See Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, at 39-40.
26 Hernandez v. Lynch, No. EDCV 16-00620-JGB (KKx), 2016 WL 7116611, at *20
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2016).
27 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b)(7), 1003.19(f), 1003.38,1236.1(d)(3)(i) (2017).
28 INA § 236(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) (2017)).
29 Hernandez, 2016 WL 7116611, at *5-6.
30 Id.
31 Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006).
32 See Matter of Sandoval-Gomez, A 092 563 965, 2008 WL 5477710, at *1 (B.I.A.
Dec. 15, 2008) (“[A]n alien’s ability to pay the bond amount is not a relevant bond
determination factor.”); Matter of Castillo-Cajura, A 089 853 733, 2009 WL 3063742,
at *1 (B.I.A. Sept. 10, 2009) (same); Matter of Castillo-Leyva, A 088 673 740, 2008
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officials routinely do not consider an individual’s ability to pay in
setting bond, and in many instances, expressly refuse to do so.33
Compounding this problem is the fact that immigration offi-
cials require that individuals ordered released on bond post the
full amount of the bond in cash, or cash equivalents, to be re-
leased.34 Immigration officials do not permit alternative forms of
secured bonds commonly found in the criminal justice system.
These include deposit bonds, where the noncitizen would post a
percentage (such as 10%) of the bond as security and the total
bond amount becomes due only if he fails to appear, as well as
property bonds, where property valued at the full bond amount
would be posted as security and would be forfeited if the person
fails to appear.35
Moreover, individuals who are unable to pay their bonds may
remain detained for months or years while their cases are pending
and are precluded from having their bonds reconsidered on the
ground that they are unable to pay. While regulations permit a
noncitizen to seek a new bond hearing “only upon a showing that
the alien’s circumstances have changed materially since the prior
bond redetermination,”36 the immigration authorities do not rec-
ognize a person’s inability to post bond, despite having made good
faith efforts to do so, as a “changed circumstance” that warrants a
new bond hearing.37
Taken together, these practices have a predictable result. Im-
migrants are routinely detained not because they pose a flight risk
or a threat to public safety, but solely because they lack the funds to
make bail. For example, in Hernandez, the district court found that
at the beginning of October 2015, “there were at least 119 individu-
als detained in” the Central District of California alone despite hav-
ing a bond set under Section 236(a).38 Their bond amounts
Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 10396, *1 (B.I.A. Sept. 18, 2008) (same); Matter of Serrano-Cor-
dova, A 099 581 986, 2009 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 2444, *2 (B.I.A. June 17, 2009)
(same).
33 Hernandez, 2016 WL 7116611, at *5-6.
34 THE NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION
LAW & DEFENSE § 7:13 (2017) (“In practice, when an immigration bond is required,
unlike in the criminal justice system, the full value of the bond must be posted either
in cash, cashier’s check, or United States Postal money order.”); see also Hernandez,
2016 WL 7116611, at *5-6.
35 PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND PHRASES RELATING TO BAIL AND
THE PRETRIAL RELEASE OR DETENTION DECISION 3 (2015).
36 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) (2017).
37 Hernandez, 2016 WL 7116611, at *5-6.
38 Id. at *5.
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ranged from $1,500 to $100,000.39 In other cases in the District, IJs
had set bonds as high as $2.5 million.40
The detention practices in the Central District reflect long-
standing trends nationwide. A recent study of immigration bonds
by TRAC Immigration—a data research project housed at Syracuse
University—found that, over a 20-year period, about one in five
persons who received a bond remained detained at the conclusion
of their removal case in immigration court, presumably because
they were unable to post the bond amount.41 That number under-
reports the problem since it does not include people who re-
mained incarcerated for weeks, months, or, like Mr. Matias, years
before they are able to post bond but are ultimately released prior
to the adjudication of their cases.42 TRAC Immigration also found
that release decisions varied greatly, ranging from release on per-
sonal recognizance without bond to “bond amounts of a million
dollars or more.”43 In general, bond amounts have increased over
time.44
The arbitrary detention of people due to their poverty causes
tremendous hardship. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
“[t]he time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on
the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life;
and it enforces idleness. . . . The time spent in jail is simply dead
time.”45 Moreover, detention significantly prejudices individuals’
access to and exercise of legal rights, hindering their “ability to
gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare [their] de-
fense.”46 The vast majority of detainees—between 79-86% nation-
ally—lack counsel in immigration proceedings.47 Immigration
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, What Happens When Individuals are
Released on Bond in Immigration Court Proceedings?, TRACIMMIGRATION (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://perma.cc/H92H-SYM3. “For cases concluded during FY 2015, 13 percent re-
mained detained even after the judge granted bond, down from 28 percent who had




44 As TRAC explains, “[t]he median bond amount set twenty years ago was $3,000.
By FY 2002 it rose to $5,000 where it remained until FY 2014 when it increased to
$6,000. In FY 2015 the median bond amount was $6,500 . . . . In FY 2015 fully half of
all bonds set were between $4,000 and $10,000.” Id.
45 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972).
46 Id. at 533.
47 See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immi-
gration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2015); see also Separate Representation for Cus-
tody and Bond Proceedings, 79 Fed. Reg. 55,659, 55,659-60 (proposed Sept. 17, 2014)
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detainees are at a distinct disadvantage as many are held in remote
locations far from legal services and have limited ability to seek or
pay for representation.48 Yet having a lawyer makes a dramatic dif-
ference in a removal case. A recent study found that detained im-
migrants with counsel won “in 21% of cases, ten-and-a-half times
greater than the 2% rate for their pro se counterparts.”49 Not sur-
prisingly then, immigrants routinely give up meritorious defenses
and acquiesce to removal because they cannot bear the prospect of
lengthy imprisonment.50
The setting of bonds without regard to ability to pay also cre-
ates a market for exploitative bail bonds companies. Families who
lack the resources to pay a full cash bond frequently are forced to
agree to usurious terms that, in the long run, drive the families
deeper into poverty. Indeed, some companies have specifically
targeted immigrant detainees and require onerous conditions in-
cluding, in certain cases, that the released noncitizens wear ankle
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003) (“Of the 265,708 initial case completions for
detained aliens from FY 2011 to FY 2013, 210,633 aliens, or 79 percent, were
unrepresented.”).
48 See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, Jails and Jumpsuits: Transforming the U.S. Immigra-
tion Detention System–A Two-Year Review 31 (2011) (“[A]lmost 40 percent of ICE’s
total bed space is located more than 60 miles from an urban center.”); COMM’N ON
IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO
PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ADJUDICA-
TION OF REMOVAL CASES 5-9 (2010) (“[R]emote facilities . . . and the practice of trans-
ferring detainees from one facility to another—often more remote—location without
notice stand in the way of retaining counsel for many detainees”.); Stacy Caplow et al.,
Accessing Justice: The Availability and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings: New York
Immigrant Representation Study Report: Part 1, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 369 (2011)
(study of detainees in New York concluded that representation rates for detainees
transferred out of state were dismal).
49 Eagly & Shafer, supra note 47, at 9; see also Caplow et al., supra note 48, at 362-64
(explaining that from 2005 to 2011, non-detained immigrants with lawyers had suc-
cessful outcomes 74% of the time, while detained immigrants without counsel pre-
vailed 3% of the time); COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 48, at 5-3
(“[T]he disparity in outcomes of immigration proceedings depending on whether
noncitizens are unrepresented or represented is striking.”).
50 For example, in a major study of asylum seekers in the expedited removal pro-
cess, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom interviewed 45 asylum
seekers who abandoned their asylum claims while in detention and found that a “sub-
stantial number reported that the conditions of their detention influenced their deci-
sion to withdraw their application for admission.” U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOLUME I: FINDINGS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 52 (2005). The same study found that over a five-year period,
detained claimants withdrew their asylum claims in immigration court at more than
double the rate of non-detained or released claimants (13% versus 5%). U.S. COMM.
ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL,
VOLUME II: EXPERT REPORTS 670 tbl.5.1 (2005).
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monitors and pay exorbitant monthly fees for their use.51 The fact
that some immigrants are able to post high bonds through bail
bonds companies risks increasing bond amounts even further, as
the those arrangements stand to distort what ICE and the IJ view as
an “affordable” bond.52 Indeed, because they are motivated by
profit, and not assessments of flight risk and danger, bail bond
companies distort pretrial release decisions in general.53
Arbitrary detentions cost U.S. taxpayers as well. In FY 2016 the
average cost of detention per person per day was nearly $187, or
approximately $2.3 billion for that year.54 By contrast, alternatives
to detention, which involve other forms of supervision, such as pe-
riodic check-ins and electronic monitoring, range in cost to taxpay-
ers from “pennies to $7 a day”55 depending on the type of
monitoring. The overuse of costly detention is especially irrational
given the high rates of compliance reported in ICE’s Alternative to
Detention (“ATD”) program. According to the Government Ac-
countability Office, ICE reports a 99% appearance rate for individ-
uals released under its “full-service” supervision program, which
includes periodic office and home visits, monitoring, and case
management services.56
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LIMITS ON THE
DETENTION OF THE IMMIGRANT POOR
The widespread detention of the immigrant poor violates the
due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amend-
ment, the Eighth Amendment Excessive Bail Clause, and the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act. Although no court prior to Hernandez
51 See, e.g., Adolfo Flores, Immigrants Desperate to Get Out of US Detention Can Get
Trapped by Debt, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jul. 23, 2016, 10:55 AM), https://perma.cc/A6X7-
W3MH; Michael E. Miller, This Company is Making Millions from America’s Broken Immi-
gration System, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/3SGT-Y9NC (“In ex-
change for their freedom, immigrants sign contracts promising to pay Libre $420 per
month while wearing the company’s GPS devices. But these contracts are the subject
of lawsuits and allegations of fraud by immigrants . . . who claim they didn’t under-
stand them.”); see also LIBRE BY NEXUS, https://perma.cc/J8JX-UPEE (last visited Nov.
30, 2017).
52 See JUSTICE POLICY INST., FOR BETTER OR FOR PROFIT: HOW THE BAIL BONDING
INDUSTRY STANDS IN THE WAY OF FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL JUSTICE 25 (2012).
53 Id. at 17-20.
54 CARL TAKEI ET AL., supra note 13, at 24.
55 Chairwoman Mikulski Releases Summary of Emergency Supplemental Funding Bill, U.S.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS (July 23, 2014), https://perma.cc/ET5S-
4WAH.
56 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-26, ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION:
IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSES NEEDED TO BETTER ASSESS PROGRAM EFFEC-
TIVENESS 30, 32 (2014).
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has had occasion to consider the issue, longstanding precedent
from both the criminal and civil detention contexts make clear
that the Constitution requires certain basic procedures to prevent
the impermissible incarceration of individuals based solely on their
lack of financial resources.57
A. Due Process
The Supreme Court has made clear that “[f]reedom from im-
prisonment . . . lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Pro-
cess] Clause protects.”58 Due process requires that immigration
detention be “reasonably relat[ed]” to the government’s legitimate
interests in preventing flight and preventing danger to the commu-
nity, and be accompanied by adequate procedures to ensure those
purposes are met.59 The government’s failure to consider immi-
grants’ financial circumstances and eligibility for alternative condi-
tions of release impermissibly results in detention based solely on
their inability to pay. Such detention is plainly not “reasonably re-
lated” to the government’s legitimate purposes.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “imprisoning a
defendant solely because of his lack of financial resources” violates
the Due Process Clause.60 For example, in Bearden v. Georgia, the
Court held that a state cannot revoke a criminal defendant’s proba-
tion due to nonpayment of a fine without a determination that the
individual “had not made sufficient bona fide efforts to pay or that
adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist.”61 The
Court has applied similar principles in civil matters.62
The federal government itself has recognized that this princi-
ple applies in the pretrial criminal context and has taken the posi-
tion that detaining someone solely because he cannot afford a
57 Since the district court’s ruling in Hernandez, at least one other district court has
held that the Constitution requires IJs to consider ability to pay when setting bond
amounts. See Celestin v. Decker, No. 17-CV-2419 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2017), ECF No. 26
(granting habeas petition).
58 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
59 See id. at 690-91 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 527 (2003).
60 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 661 (1983).
61 Id. at 661-62. The rule of Bearden followed from prior cases prohibiting incarcer-
ation beyond the statutory maximum solely because of an inability to pay a fine, Wil-
liams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970), and the conversion of a fine imposed
under a fine-only statute into a jail term solely because of the defendant’s indigence,
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-99 (1971).
62 See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 447-48 (2011) (holding that due process
requires adequate procedures and specific findings as to the individual’s ability to pay
child support before incarcerating him for civil contempt).
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money bond is not reasonably related to the government’s legiti-
mate goals.63 The lower courts have likewise found that bail
schemes violate due process where they do not consider ability to
pay and alternative conditions. For example, in Pugh v. Rainwater,
the Fifth Circuit found that “[t]he incarceration of those who can-
not [pay a money bail], without meaningful consideration of other
possible alternatives, infringes on both due process and equal pro-
tection requirements.”64 As the court explained, at a bail hearing,
“[t]he ultimate inquiry in each instance is what is necessary to rea-
sonably assure defendant’s presence at trial.”65 Thus, while a bail
“requirement as is necessary to provide reasonable assurance of the
accused’s presence at trial is constitutionally permissible,” “[a]ny
requirement in excess of that amount would be inherently punitive
and run afoul of due process.”66 Moreover, “in the case of an indi-
gent, whose appearance at trial could reasonably be assured by
[an] alternate form[ ] of release, pretrial confinement for inability
to post money bail would constitute imposition of an excessive
restraint.”67
The government’s bond practices in the immigration context
violate these principles. The detention of immigrants on bonds
that are set without regard for their ability to pay does not advance
the government’s legitimate interests in preventing danger and
flight,68 and therefore violates their due process rights. This is espe-
cially so where the government has recourse to a range of alterna-
63 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee
and Urging Affirmance on the Issue Addressed Herein at 12-13, Walker v. City of
Calhoun, 682 F. App’x 721 (11th Cir. 2017) (Case No. 16-10521).
64 Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1058; accord Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15–CV–0170–HLM, 2016 WL
361612, at *10-11, *14 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016) (granting class-wide preliminary in-
junction); Jones v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15cv34–MHT, 2015 WL 5387219, at *2
(M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015) (“[T]he use of a secured bail schedule to detain a person
after arrest, without an individualized hearing regarding the person’s indigence and
the need for bail or alternatives to bail, violates the Due Process Clause . . . .”); Cooper
v. City of Dothan, No. 1:15-cv-425-WKW, 2015 WL 10013003, at *1-2 (M.D. Ala. June
18, 2015) (granting temporary restraining order); see also O’Donnell v. Harris Cty.,
No. 4:16-cv-01414, 2017 WL 1735453 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017) (order granting pre-
liminary injunction) (holding that the government’s policy or practice of detaining
misdemeanor defendants on secured money bail is unconstitutional); O’Donnell v.
Harris Cty., 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 731-34 (S.D. Tex. 2016) (denying motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6)); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d
758, 761, 767-69 (M.D. Tenn. 2015) (holding that detaining misdemeanor probation-
ers on money bail without inquiry into their ability to pay was unconstitutional and
granting class-wide preliminary injunction).
68 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
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tives to bond that are highly effective.69
Moreover, immigration officials cannot determine an appro-
priate bond amount without considering a noncitizen’s ability to
pay. The purpose of a bond is to deter flight risk.70 However, the
degree to which a bond will deter flight risk necessarily depends on
an individual’s financial resources. While a $1,500 bond may serve
as a significant deterrent for an indigent person like Mr. Matias, it
would serve as little to no deterrent for a millionaire. Therefore, by
ignoring immigrants’ ability to pay, immigration officials set bond
amounts that are necessarily arbitrary and bear no rational rela-
tionship to the purpose of setting bond, in violation of due process.
Likewise, without consideration of whether someone should be re-
leased on alternative conditions of release, the authorities have no
way of determining whether a bond even needs to be imposed in
the first place.
B. Equal Protection
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from
denying individuals the equal protection of the laws.71 The govern-
ment’s existing bond procedures deny release to one class of
noncitizens who cannot pay a money bond, while affording release
to noncitizens who can. These procedures—although facially neu-
tral—result in detention that is “wholly contingent on one’s ability
to pay, and thus ‘visi[t] different consequences on two categories
of persons.’”72 Such “imprisonment solely because of indigent sta-
tus is invidious discrimination and not constitutionally
permissible.”73
Applying these principles, numerous federal courts have re-
cently invalidated bond systems that—by failing to consider indi-
viduals’ ability to pay—imprison poor people while letting those
relatively rich go free.74 The federal government itself has acknowl-
69 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 56, at 30, 32.
70 See Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 37-38 (B.I.A. 2006).
71 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 57 (2001)
(“[T]he equal protection guarantee [is] embedded in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.”).
72 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127 (1996) (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
235, 242 (1970)).
73 Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1056 (citing Williams, 399 U.S. at 235; Tate v.
Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397 (1971)).
74 See, e.g., Walker v. City of Calhoun, No. 4:15–CV–0170–HLM, 2016 WL 361612,
at *10-11, *14 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016); Thompson v. Moss Point, No. 1:15-cv-182LG-
RHW, 2015 WL 10322003, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2015); Jones v. City of Clanton,
No. 2:15cv34–MHT, 2015 WL 5387219, at *2-3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015); Cooper v.
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edged that “a bail scheme that imposes financial conditions, with-
out individualized consideration of ability to pay and whether such
conditions are necessary to assure appearance at trial” and “mean-
ingful consideration of alternatives, infringes on equal protection
and due process requirements.”75
The immigration authorities’ bond practices do not meet this
test. Immigration detention is a severe deprivation of fundamental
liberty. The detention of immigrants because they cannot afford to
post their bonds lacks any rational connection to their detention’s
purported purpose—the prevention of flight risk. And again, the
government has recourse to a range of alternative conditions of
supervision, alone or in combination with a lower bond or other
form of secured bond, to ensure that they appear for removal
proceedings.
C. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment’s “Excessive Bail Clause prevents the
imposition of bail conditions that are excessive in light of the valid
interests the state seeks to protect by offering bail.”76 The govern-
ment therefore “may not set bail to achieve invalid interests, nor in
an amount that is excessive in relation to the valid interests it seeks
to achieve.”77 Under the Bail Clause, and its federal statutory coun-
terpart, the Bail Reform Act,78 “the amount of bail should not be
used as an indirect, but effective, method of ensuring continued
custody.”79
The Supreme Court has made clear that the Eighth Amend-
ment is not limited to criminal proceedings.80 In Austin v. United
City of Dothan, No. 1:15-cv-425-WKW, 2015 WL 10013003, at *1-2 (M.D. Ala. June 18,
2015) (“[T]he court finds that the motion for a temporary restraining order is due to
be granted in part and denied in part.”); Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15-cv-570-
HEA, 2015 WL 10013006, at *1, *3-4 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015) (issuing declaratory
judgment); see also O’Donnell v. Harris Cty., 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, 729-33 (S.D. Tex.
2016); Rodriguez v. Providence Cmty. Corr., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 758, 761, 767-69
(M.D. Tenn. 2015).
75 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee and
Urging Affirmance on the Issue Addressed Herein, supra note 63, at 13.
76 Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 660 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987)).
77 Id. (internal citations omitted).
78 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2017).
79 United States v. Leisure, 710 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1983); see also United States
v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[T]he setting of bond unreachable
because of its amount would be tantamount to setting no conditions at all.”).
80 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 607-09 (1993) (holding that the Exces-
sive Fines Clause applies to civil forfeitures).
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States, the Court explained that, unlike other provisions of the Bill
of Rights, the Eighth Amendment is not limited by its terms to
criminal proceedings, and therefore should be applied in civil pro-
ceedings where it would serve the Amendment’s purposes.81 Im-
portantly, the Court has acknowledged that applying the Excessive
Bail Clause in civil immigration proceedings is consistent with its
purpose.82 This view finds further support in the Eighth Amend-
ment’s history.83
Here, the Eighth Amendment requires immigration officials
to consider a detainee’s financial circumstances and alternatives to
a full cash bond to ensure that the terms of release are not “exces-
sive” in relation to their purpose.84 Where the government’s inter-
est in preventing danger or flight can be addressed by release on
bail, “bail must be set by a court at a sum designed to ensure that
goal, and no more.”85 The evaluation of whether bail is “set at a
sum greater than that necessary” to satisfy the government’s inter-
ests must consider a detainee’s ability to pay a bond and the availa-
bility of alternatives to a full cash bond.86 The government’s failure
to provide such procedures violates immigrants’ Eighth Amend-
ment rights.
D. Immigration and Nationality Act
Finally, the government’s practices violate the INA. The plain
language of Section 1226(a) contemplates that immigration au-
thorities will consider the individual for release on “bond . . . or . . .
81 Id.; see also id. at 609 n.5.
82 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 263
n.3 (1989) (“The potential for governmental abuse which the Bail Clause guards
against is present in both” “a criminal case or in a civil deportation proceeding.”); cf.
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-40 (1952) (assuming that the Excessive Bail
Clause applied to immigration detention, but holding that the Clause did not pro-
hibit the Attorney General’s detention without bail of several members of the Com-
munist Party pending the resolution of their deportation cases).
83 See Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons
from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1254 n.126, 1255 n.28 (1987) (“[B]ail or its close
cousin, mainprize, commonly were used in civil proceedings [in the Founding era].”).
84 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5, 5 n.3 (1951) (“[The Eighth Amendment requires]
the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant
to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant. The traditional standards
as expressed in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are to be applied in each
case to each defendant . . . [including] the financial ability of the defendant to give
bail . . . .”).
85 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987); Stack, 342 U.S. at 5 (“Bail set
at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated [to ensure the defendant’s
presence at trial] is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”).
86 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 753-54.
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conditional parole.”87 Moreover, under the canon of constitutional
avoidance, a statute must be construed to avoid serious constitu-
tional problems where “fairly possible.”88 The Supreme Court and
lower courts have repeatedly applied the avoidance canon to con-
strue the immigration detention laws to require procedural protec-
tions.89 Because Section 236(a) is silent about what immigration
officials must consider when setting bond amounts,90 the statute
therefore can and must be construed to require consideration of
ability to pay to avoid the serious constitutional concerns that
would otherwise be presented. Indeed, the government itself has
recognized that Section 236(a) can be construed to require immi-
gration officials to consider ability to pay and release on alternative
conditions of supervision: for certain families in immigration de-
tention, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has in-
structed officers to “offer release with an appropriate monetary
bond or other condition of release” and set “a family’s bond
amount at a level that is reasonable and realistic, taking into ac-
count ability to pay, while also encompassing risk of flight and pub-
lic safety.”91 Courts outside the immigration context have applied
the canon to construe statutes to require consideration of ability to
pay and alternatives to incarceration to avoid constitutional con-
87 INA § 236(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2017)) (emphasis added); see also
Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[I]f DHS detains a non-
citizen, an IJ is already empowered to ameliorat[e] the conditions by imposing a less
restrictive means of supervision than detention.”) (quotation marks omitted), cert.
granted sub nom. Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016); Rivera v. Holder, 307
F.R.D. 539, 553 (W.D. Wash 2015) (“§ 1226(a) unambiguously states that an IJ may
consider conditions for release beyond a monetary bond.”).
88 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689-90 (finding that, because of the constitutional
concerns posed by indefinite detention, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) limits an non-citizen’s
post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that
non-citizen’s removal from the United States); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380
(2005); Rodriguez, 804 F.3d at 1078, 1086-89 (construing immigration detention stat-
utes to require a bond hearing at six months under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)); Diouf v.
Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) to
require bond hearings for noncitizens detained for prolonged periods); Casas-Castril-
lon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2008) (construing
§ 1226(a) to require bond hearings for noncitizens with a petition for review and stay
of removal); Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (construing 8
U.S.C.§ 1225(b) to not authorize indefinite immigration detention).
90 See INA § 236(a) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2017) (authorizing “re-
lease” on a “bond of at least $1,500 . . . or . . . conditional parole.”).
91 See Press Release, Jeh C. Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., Statement
by Jeh C. Johnson on Family Residential Centers (June 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/
QEW7-WZ5X. Indeed, the government’s disparate treatment of detained families and
single adult detainees arguably raises its own equal protection concerns.
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cerns as well.92
III. HERNANDEZ V. SESSIONS
Hernandez seeks to enforce these constitutional and statutory
rights. The ACLU, along with pro bono attorneys from Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, filed Hernandez in the spring of
2016 on behalf of a class of noncitizens in the Central District of
California who are or will be detained under Section 236(a) after
being ordered released on a bond set under the government’s
bond policies and practices.93 Plaintiffs allege that the government
violated their constitutional and statutory rights by failing, among
other things, to consider their ability to pay a bond, and alternative
conditions of release to a full cash bond, in determining the appro-
priate conditions for their release.94 Plaintiffs also moved for a
class-wide preliminary injunction to redress these violations.95
On November 10, 2016, the District Court denied the govern-
ment’s motion to dismiss, granted Plaintiffs’ motion for class certi-
fication, and granted a class-wide preliminary injunction requiring
immigration officials to consider noncitizens’ ability to pay a bond
and alternatives at custody determinations.96 The order required
that, “when setting, re-determining, and/or reviewing the terms of
any person’s release,” ICE and IJs:
must (a) consider the person’s financial ability to pay a bond;
(b) not set bond at a greater amount than that needed to ensure
the person’s appearance; and (c) consider whether the person
may be released on alternative conditions of supervision, alone
or in combination with a lower bond amount, that are sufficient
to mitigate flight risk.97
The order also required the parties to meet and confer on develop-
ing guidelines and instructions for ICE officers and IJs in applying
the order’s terms, and directed the government to conduct new
92 See United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1391 (9th Cir. 1985) (construing fed-
eral statute to require courts and the Parole Commission to “find that alternative
punishments to incarceration” are insufficient “before imprisoning an offender who
has not complied with a restitution order but has made sufficient bona fide efforts to
pay” due to due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment concerns); Pugh,
572 F.2d at 1057 (construing state bail statute to require consideration of alternatives
to money bail because of due process and equal protection concerns).
93 Hernandez v. Lynch, No. EDCV 16-00620-JGB (KKx), 2016 WL 7116611, at *1-2
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2016).
94 Id. at *2.
95 Id.
96 Id. at *9-30.
97 Order Granting Plaintiffs-Petitioners’ Mot. for Class-Wide Prelim. Inj. at ¶ 1,
Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 5:16-00620-JGB-KK (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2017), ECF No. 84.
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bond hearings for current detainees whose bonds were set without
the benefit of the order’s protections.98 The government filed an
interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit.99
On October 2, 2012, the Ninth Circuit—in an opinion by
Judge Stephen Reinhardt—affirmed the preliminary injunction or-
der on due process grounds. Applying well-established case law, the
court reaffirmed that although “[t]he government has legitimate
interests in protecting the public and in ensuring that noncitizens
in removal proceedings appear for hearings, . . . any detention inci-
dental to removal must ‘bear[ ] [a] reasonable relation to [its] pur-
pose.’”100 “Detention of an indigent ‘for inability to post money
bail’ is impermissible if the individual’s ‘appearance at trial could
reasonably be assured by one of the alternate forms of release.’”101
As the court explained:
Given that the detainees have been determined to be neither
dangerous nor so great a flight risk as to require detention with-
out bond, the question before us is: Is consideration of the de-
tainees’ financial circumstances, as well as of possible alternative
release conditions, necessary to ensure that the conditions of
their release will be reasonably related to the governmental in-
terest in ensuring their appearance at future hearings? We con-
clude that the answer is yes.
A bond determination process that does not include considera-
tion of financial circumstances and alternative release condi-
tions is unlikely to result in a bond amount that is reasonably
related to the government’s legitimate interests. Since the gov-
ernment’s purpose in conditioning release on the posting of a
bond in a certain amount is to “provide enough incentive” for
released detainees to appear in the future, we cannot under-
stand why it would ever refuse to consider financial circum-
stances: the amount of bond that is reasonably likely to secure
the appearance of an indigent person obviously differs from the
amount that is reasonably likely to secure a wealthy person’s ap-
pearance. Nor can we understand why the government would
refuse to consider alternatives to monetary bonds that would
98 Id. at ¶¶ 2-6.
99 Docketing Letter, Hernandez v. Lynch, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-
56829), ECF No. 1. (The Ninth Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction pending
appeal); Order Granting Stay, Hernandez v. Lynch, 872 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2017) (No.
16-56829), ECF No. 9.
100 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001)).
101 Id. (quoting Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)).
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also serve the same interest the bond requirement purportedly
advances . . . .
Setting a bond amount without considering financial circum-
stances or alternative conditions of release undermines the con-
nection between the bond and the legitimate purpose of
ensuring the non-citizen’s presence at future hearings. There is
simply no way for the government to know whether a lower
bond or an alternative condition would adequately serve those
purposes when it fails to consider those matters. Therefore, the
government’s current policies fail to provide “adequate proce-
dural protections” to ensure that detention of the class members
is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
Indeed, as the court illustrated, “[b]y maintaining a process for es-
tablishing the amount of a bond that . . . fails to consider the indi-
vidual’s financial ability to obtain a bond in the amount assessed or
to consider alternative conditions of release, the government risks
detention that accomplishes ‘little more than punishing a person
for his poverty.’”
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? MASS IMMIGRATION
DETENTION IN THE TRUMP ERA
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Hernandez comes at a critical
time in the history of the immigration detention system. As part of
its plans to ramp up immigration enforcement, the Trump admin-
istration has pledged to expand immigration detention on an un-
precedented scale. Issued in the first week of the administration,
Executive Order No. 13767, “Border Security and Immigration En-
forcement Improvements,” declares that “[i]t is the policy of the
executive branch to . . . detain individuals apprehended on suspi-
cion of violating Federal or State law, including Federal immigra-
tion law, pending further proceedings regarding those
violations.”102 To implement this new policy, the Order directs the
Secretary of Homeland Security to “take all appropriate action and
allocate all legally available resources to immediately construct, op-
erate, control, or establish contracts to construct, operate, or con-
trol facilities to detain aliens at or near the land border with
Mexico.”103
The Order portends changes that are arguably even crueler
than the government’s existing detention practices, insofar as they
may dispense altogether with individualized consideration of flight
102 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017).
103 Id. at 8794.
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risk and danger for large classes of noncitizens. The Order pro-
vides that:
The Secretary shall immediately take all appropriate actions to
ensure the detention of aliens apprehended for violations of im-
migration law pending the outcome of their removal proceed-
ings or their removal from the country to the extent permitted
by law. The Secretary shall issue new policy guidance to all De-
partment of Homeland Security personnel regarding the appro-
priate and consistent use of lawful detention authority under
the INA, including the termination of the practice commonly
known as “catch and release,” whereby aliens are routinely re-
leased in the United States shortly after their apprehension for
violations of immigration law.104
In late February 2017, the Secretary of Homeland Security is-
sued a memorandum on the implementation of the Executive Or-
der.105 Like the Order, the memorandum calls for the end of
“catch and release,” which it defines as “[p]olicies that facilitate the
release of removable aliens apprehended at and between the ports
of entry, which allow them to abscond and fail to appear at their
removal hearings.”106 The memorandum further provides that,
upon the deployment of sufficient agency personnel and establish-
ment of new processing and detention facilities in the Southwest
border region, the release of noncitizens “apprehended or en-
countered after illegally entering or attempting to illegally enter
the United States” shall be limited only to certain enumerated
circumstances.107
Although the precise impact of the memorandum remains un-
clear, it suggests that, upon the expansion of its detention capabili-
ties, DHS will seek to categorically detain border crossers, without
individualized consideration of flight risk and danger. Thus, many
noncitizens will likely be detained without the possibility of release
by ICE—except in perhaps extreme humanitarian cases—and will
only be able to seek release from the IJ at a bond hearing. Moreo-
ver, at the bond hearing, ICE assumedly will oppose release cate-
gorically, or demand a high bond, based on the policy rationales
set forth in the Executive Order. Indeed, DHS recently pursued a
comparable “no release” policy under the Obama administration
104 Id. at 8795.
105 Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin
McAleenan, Acting Cmm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, et al., Implementing
the President’s Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements Policies
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/EKM2-KXFK.
106 Id. at 2.
107 Id.
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in response to the increase in women and children seeking asylum
from Central America in the summer of 2014—a policy that was
ultimately enjoined by a federal court in a nationwide class action
brought by the ACLU.108 Should DHS pursue the categorical de-
tention of migrants in the name of ending “catch and release,” it
will be critical to defend the bedrock due process requirement
that—outside certain narrow circumstances—the government may
not deprive an individual of liberty absent an individualized deter-
mination of flight risk and danger.109 Hernandez and other litiga-
tion defending these basic rights will become all the more
important in this period of retrenchment.
CONCLUSION
The Hernandez case comes at a critical juncture. Across the
country, state and local criminal justice systems are moving away
from pre-trial systems that rely on money bonds that result in the
detention of people based on their poverty alone. Where money
bonds are still utilized, a string of court decisions have enforced
critical constitutional protections to ensure that a defendant’s abil-
ity to pay, and the suitability of non-monetary conditions of release,
are considered when determining an appropriate bond amount. As
these decisions and the Department of Justice have recognized, de-
tention based on poverty alone is arbitrary and unconstitutional.
Hernandez seeks to enforce these core constitutional protec-
tions in the immigration system, where they are sorely lacking.
Every day, hundreds, if not thousands, of immigrants like Cesar
Matias remain locked up for months and years, not because they
present a danger or serious risk of flight, but simply because they
lack the resources to pay a bond. As the Trump administration
threatens to greatly expand the immigration system, it is all the
more critical to establish protections that will prevent further arbi-
trary and unnecessary detentions of the immigrant poor.
108 See R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F. Supp. 3d 164, 189-91 (D.D.C. 2015) (enjoining DHS
from detaining migrant families to deter further migration from Central America).
109 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997) (upholding civil commitment
of sex offenders after jury trial on dangerousness); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
81-83 (1992) (requiring individualized finding of mental illness and dangerousness
for civil commitment); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (upholding
pretrial detention of criminal defendants only with individualized findings of danger-
ousness or flight risk at bond hearings). But see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513
(2003) (upholding the mandatory detention of immigrants who concede they are
deportable based on certain criminal convictions, for the brief period necessary for
removal proceedings).
